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COMMENTARY
THE MEANING OF LIBERTY: NOTES ON
PROBLEMS WITHIN THE FRATERNITY
RONALD A. CASS*
The term "liberty" makes three appearances in the Con-
stitution. The preamble identifies among the Constitution's
purposes securing "the blessings of liberty to ourselves and
our posterity." The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments pro-
hibit the federal and state governments, respectively, from
depriving "any person of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law." The preamble has not been a source of
much controversy, possibly because it serves only a precatory
function.' The liberty safeguarded by the due process
clauses, however, has been a source of considerable dispute.2
* Professor of Law, Boston University. Thanks to Ira C. Lupu, Henry
P. Monaghan, and Glen 0. Robinson for helpful advice and to Deborah
Fawcett and Michael Fricklas (Boston University School of Law, Class of
1984) for their assistance.
This paper was written as commentary on a paper by Professors Timothy
Terrell and George Butler, The New Liberty: Philosophical and Historical Per-
spectives on a Fundamental Constitutional Value (January 1984) (copy on file
with author). After the completion of this paper, Professors Terrell and
Butler revised their paper, separated it into two distinct papers, and then
amended and extended their individual works. Their revisions do not sig-
nificantly affect the content of my comments. The alterations do, however,
make some aspects of this commentary seem odd. The opening reference
to the use of the term "liberty" in the Constitution, for instance, now finds
a parallel at the beginning of Professor Terrell's revised paper; the refer-
ence to a constant "total amount" of liberty-a comment with which I had
some fun, too much in fact to delete the reference-now has been excised;
and the expression "the new liberty" has been dropped. I feel a little like
someone who, asked to comment on the youthful Orson Welles, said "a bit
thin," then found the comment reprinted years later beside a picture of
the fully developed celebrity.
1. But see W. CROSSKEY, I POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION 374-79
(1953) (arguing that the preamble was not intended to be merely
precatory).
2. Compare, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701-12 (1976) (repu-
tation damage caused by distribution of flyer portraying respondent as
shoplifter does not constitute deprivation of protected liberty interest) with
Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 435-38 (1970) (reputation dam-
age caused by posting of notice portraying respondent as an excessive
drinker did constitute deprivation of protected liberty interest).
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This is especially true of the Fourteenth Amendment's lib-
erty, which has passed its older sibling by ingesting most of
the Bill of Rights.'
Defining the protection of liberty under these clauses is
no easy matter. Three problems frustrate interpretive efforts.
First, interpretive criteria must be selected. This is a general
problem of constitutional adjudication, but it has particular
importance for provisions as ambiguous and potentially far-
reaching as the due process clauses. Second, a framework for
analyzing due process issues must be constructed. This effort
is largely informed by principles that underlie, as well as
those derived from, more general interpretive considerations.
Third, the practical scope of the constitutional protection
must be determined for particular cases or categories. Diffi-
culty in applying the clauses to specific situations reflects the
lack of success at the two prior tasks.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: LOOSE CHANGE OR No
CHANGE
The selection of interpretive criteria is one of the "hardy
perennials" of constitutional law debate. All constitutional
decisionmaking is an uneasy compromise between historical
information and current intuition. Neither source of deci-
sional criteria provides anything approaching unassailable
principles. The different attitudes toward constancy and
change, legislative and judicial competence, governmental
and private power, that are implicated in argument over in-
terpretive criteria cannot be brought to heel by reference to
logic, objective data, or shared norms. Logic requires a predi-
cate. Objective data are scarce. And few meaningful norms
are shared.
The following pages briefly recapitulate, the major inter-
3. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1968) (in-
corporating Sixth Amendment's guarantee of right to jury trial in criminal
cases into Fourteenth Amendment); Malloy v. Hogan, 387 U.S. 1 (1964)
(Fifth Amendment freedom from mandatory self-incrimination); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel);
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (Fourth Amendment freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927)
(First Amendment freedoms of speech, press and religion). But see Boiling
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (application of the Fourteenth Amendment's
equal protection clause to the federal government through the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment). See also Linde, judges, Critics, and the Real-
ist Tradition, 82 YALE L. J. 227, 233-34 (1972) (commenting on "reverse
incorporation").
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pretive arguments that are prologue to dispute over the ana-
lytical framework for the due process clauses. Failure of any
approach to provide a fully satisfactory construct for constitu-
tional decisionmaking ineluctably translates into argument at
the next stage over very similar issues. The main interpretive
approaches discussed here are those grouped under the labels
of Interpretivism, Neutrality, and Proceduralism, and their
opposite numbers.
A. The Interpretivist Debate
Since Marbury v. Madison," it has been "settled law" that
courts are the ultimate arbiters of constitutional meaning ex-
cept as they find deference to other bodies appropriate.5 Ar-
gument persists, however, over the standards to be used in
interpreting the Constitution and over the appropriateness of
judicial deference to other bodies. The two arguments are, of
course, inextricably linked. But for ease of discussion, the
deference argument will be deferred.
The standards argument has two main branches. One
currently goes by the name "Interpretivism;" its opposite
number is "Noninterpretivism." 6 As Professor Paul Brest has
pointed out, the terms are somewhat misleading since propo-
nents of each are engaged in constitutional interpretation.7
Basically, the difference between interpretive and noninter-
pretive approaches is the degree to which history is taken as a
guide for constitutional interpretation. Judge Learned Hand,
in his 1958 Holmes Lectures at Harvard Law School, urged
4. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703-05 (1974)
("We therefore reaffirm that it is the province and duty of this Court 'to
say what the law is' with respect to the claim of privilege presented in this
case."); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969) ("[Ilt is the re-
sponsibility of this Court to act as the ultimate interpreter of the Constitu-
tion."); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) ("Deciding whether a mat-
ter has in any measure been committed by the Constitution to another
branch of government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds
whatever authority-has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in con-
stitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate
interpreter of the Constitution."); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17-19
(1958) ("[Marbury] declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is
supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that principle
has ever since been respected by this Court and the country as a perma-
nent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system.")
6. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 1 (1980).
7. Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60
B.U. L. REV. 204, 204 n. 1 (1980).
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that courts rest their constitutional interpretations on the
ground of "historical meaning." ' The finding of historical
meaning is seldom easy, and the search can take a variety of
directions. One direction is to examine the relevant constitu-
tional text in the light of historical evidence on the use and
meaning of the words.' A second direction looks at evidence
of the intent of the framers, drawing on sources that might
reveal the framers' attitudes on the subject in dispute." The
third direction is to infer historical meaning from the struc-
ture of the constitution and the placement of the provision at
issue."
There are obvious difficulties with all three approaches.
The textual-historical approach rarely is adequate by itself.
The meaning of words in 1789 or 1791 is not likely to yield a
determinate interpretation for the particular combination of
words in the constitutional text. Moreover, the historical
meaning is second-best evidence. The reason for looking to
the use of language at the time it was employed in constitu-
tional text must be to provide a basis for inferring what those
who chose the words intended. 2 The intentional-historical
8. L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 65 (1958).
9. See, e.g., T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITA-
TIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE
AMERICAN UNION 124 (Carrington's 8th ed. 1927) (n.p. 1868) ("The mean-
ing of the constitution is fixed when it is adopted, and it is not different at
any subsequent time when a court has occasion to pass upon it."); H. BLACK,
HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS 20
(1911):
It is a cardinal rule in the interpretation of constitutions that the
instrument must be so construed as to give effect to the intention
of the people, who adopted it. This intention is to be sought in the
Constitution itself, and the apparent meaning of the words em-
ployed is to be taken as expressing it, except in cases where that
assumption would lead to absurdity, ambiguity, or contradiction.
10. See, e.g., R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFOR-
MATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 368 (1977); Berger, A Political Sci-
entist as Constitutional Lawyer: A Reply to Louis Fisher, 41 OHIO ST. L. J. 147,
162-63, 167 (1980); Maltz, Some New Thoughts on an Old Problem - The
Role of the Intent of the Framers in Constitutional Theory, 63 B.U.L. REV. 811
(1983); Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353 (1981);
Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEx. L. REV. 693 (1976).
11. See, e.g., C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 7, 29, (1969); Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amend-
ment Problems, 47 IND. L.J., 1, 17, 23 (1971).
12. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 6, at 16 ("Something that wasn't rati-
fied can't be part of our Constitution, and sometimes in order to know
what was ratified we need to know what was intended. . . .The most impor-
tant datum bearing on what was intended is the constitutional language itself.")
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approach, thus, is implicit in the textual-historical construct.
Unfortunately, this second approach is likewise difficult to
employ. There are fragmentary writings from a number of
the framers that discuss directly specific constitutional provi-
sions and more fragments that discuss concepts implicated in
constitutional provisions. Few of these discussions are con-
temporaneous with the writing of the Constitution. 3 Not all
are consistent one with another. 4 The writers were not free
from self-interest."5 They not only had divergent interpreta-
tions of what their joint accomplishment was, but also differ-
ing motives behind their discussions of the subject at issue.
And even if these writings provided an accurate picture of
each author's intent at the moment of constitutional encapsu-
lation, they account for but a fraction of the group that par-
ticipated in constitutional proposal and ratification.'8 The
third interpretivist branch, structural-historical, is less depen-
dent on direct historical evidence. 7 At the same time, it en-
tails even greater room for interpolation from the available
data.
Virtually all commentary recognizes the difficulty of
these interpretive approaches." The advocates of different
approaches do not agree on the degree of difficulty.' 9 But the
more important disagreement is over the extent to which in-
(Emphasis in original); Monaghan, supra note 10, at 374-75, 377 (1981)
("All Law, the Constitution not excepted, is a purposive ordering of
norms. Textual language embodies one or more purposes, and the text
may be understood and usefully applied only if its purposes are understood
... . Thus the central issue is the role of original intent in constitutional
interpretation.")
13. See, e.g., Wofford, The Blinding Light: The Uses of History in Consti-
tutional Interpretation, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 502, 503-08 (1964).
14. Id.; Greenawalt, The Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles,
78 COLUM. L. REV. 982, 1015 (1978); Munzer & Nickel, Does the Constitution
Mean What It Always Meant?, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1029, 1032 (1977).
15. Brest, supra note 7, at 229.
16. Id. at 230.
17. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 11, at 22 ("We are, then, forced to
construct our own theory of the constitutional protection of speech. We
cannot solve our problems simply by reference to the text or its history.").
18. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 6, at 11-41; C. MILLER, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE UsES OF HISTORY 153-61 (1969); Brest, supra note 7, at
219; Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution? 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 715-
17 (1975); Monaghan, supra note 10, at 377; Sandalow, Constitutional Inter-
pretation, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1033, 1060-68 (1981); Tushnet, Following the
Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV.
L. REV. 781 793-804 (1983); Wofford, supra note 13, at 502, 509-11, 528-
32 (1964).
19. See sources cited supra note 18.
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formation drawn from any of these interpretivist approaches
should govern judicial construction of the document. Profes-
sor Henry Monaghan frames the interpretivist position
succintly:
Our legal grundnorm has been that the body politic can at
a specific point in time definitively order relationships, and
that such an ordering is binding on all organs of govern-
ment until changed by amendment. 0
In other words, the search for historic meaning may be diffi-
cult, but it is implicit in the existence of a written constitu-
tion. Much like the reconstruction of a dinosaur from frag-
ments, the understanding must be that the appropriate task is
to replicate the original, not to ask what shape we now would
like the beast to take.21
The opposed, noninterpretivist argument is that the
original intent of the framers - the dead hand of antiquity
- should not govern constitutional interpretation today.2
Professor Robert Cover propounds one form of this
argument:
If the Supreme Court ought to labor under the constraint
of the framers' specific intentions it is because we and our
progeny will find it useful that the justices be constrained in
that way. In other words this reading of the Constitution
must stand or fall not upon the Constitution's self-evident
meaning, nor upon the intentions of 1789 or 1866 framers.
It constitutes a judgment about our own political present
and future and about alternative theories of judicial activity
which will best serve it. The ultimate and only justification
for the constitutional government we have is that it will se-
cure to us and our posterity the blessings of liberty - not
that it was intended by the framers to bind us.22
The noninterpretivist argument encompasses several dis-
crete points and covers disparate methods of adjudication.
One point is that the framers did not foresee current
problems.24 This argument does not go far. It is always possi-
20. Monaghan, supra note 10, at 376 (original emphasis).
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1-2 (Supp.
1979); Brest, supra note 7, at 219; Cover, Book Review NEW REPUBLIC, Jan.
14, 1978, at 26-27.
23. Id. at 26-27.
24. E.g., Greenawalt, supra note 14, at 1014; Munzer & Nickel,
supra note 14, at 1031-33; Tushnet, supra note 18, at 788.
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ble to adapt old solutions to new problems. The real thrust of
the observation about new problems is that old ways of think-
ing about what government should or should not do, about
what its various branches should or should not do, would
change if presented with new and different difficulties.28 This
argument does not suggest any necessary mode of constitu-
tional interpretation. It comes close to the intentional-histori-
cal interpretivist approach, but allows the modern interpreter
to find that old values are disserved by old solutions. How
new solutions then are identified is unclear.
Another string in the noninterpretivist bow is that pre-
sent values differ from past values and constitutional inter-
pretation should not be frozen into accord with past values. 26
A variant of this is that the Constitution should be used to
assist transition from present to future values.27 Both forms
of the "modern value" argument see the constitutional text
as a useful tool for securing new visions of social good.28 One
approach consistent with this point allows modern usage of
old constitutional language to bridge the generation gap. 29
The words are retained, but the meaning changes; the mel-
ody is gone, but the song lingers on. Another approach sug-
gested by this argument is to (somehow) identify contempo-
rary values that constitutional adjudication might serve and
to interpret textual commands in light of the current balance
of such values.30
Finally, the noninterpretivist argument may comprehend
constitutional adjudication informed by moral principles,
even if not accepted by the framers, adopted generally at pre-
sent, or likely to gain substantial popular acquiescence in the
foreseeable future. These moral principles may be exogenous
to the Constitution, 1 may be read back into the constitu-
25. See, e.g., Brest, supra note 7, at 216-17, 200-21; Greenawalt,
supra note 14, at 1014-16.
26. See, e.g., Brest, supra note 7, passim. See also Greenawalt, supra
note 14, at 1015-16; Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional
Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, (1973).
27. See, e.g., Perry, Noninterpretive Review in Human Rights Cases: A
Functional Justification, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 278 (1981).
28. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW iii-iv (1978).
29. Schauer, An Essay on Constitutional Language, 29 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
797, 824-32 (1982).
30. See, e.g., Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 77 MICH. L. REV. 981 (1979).
31. See, e.g., Tushnet, The Newer Property: Suggestions for the Revival of
Substantive Due Process, 1975 SuP. CT. REv. 261, 279-80.
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tional contract,32 or may be a fusion of judges' moral sense
and past constitutional construction.33 In all three cases, the
point is not really that these moral principles were in fact in-
tended by the framers but that they should guide constitu-
tional decision today.
As with interpretivist approaches, the noninterpretivist
approaches are problematic." They rarely yield determinate
results, unless one accepts all the tenets of a given advocate.
And, even more than with interpretivist approaches, the
claim of any construct to legitimacy appears suspect. These
matters will be treated further below.
B. Precedent and Neutrality
For the strong forms of both interpretivism and
noninterpretivism, precedent presents a problem. Why
should the interpretivist be bound by an interpretation that
seems contrary to the original understanding or a noninter-
pretivist by a decision that does not accord with his princi-
ples? Professor Brest, arguing that original meaning should
play some role but not a controlling one, asserts that judicial
performance (at least by the Supreme Court) has been gov-
erned largely by precedent:
[I]f you consider the evolution of doctrines in just about
any extensively-adjudicated area of constitutional law . . .
explicit reliance on originalist sources has played a very
small role compared to the elaboration of the Court's own
precedents. It is rather like having a remote ancestor who
came over on the Mayflower. 5
This may be so, but precedent, as the Legal Realist school
emphasized, hardly places iron bonds on judges." Brest in
large measure is arguing for an approach that frees constitu-
tional adjudication not just from original intent but from all
32. See D. RICHARDS, THE MORAL CRITICISM OF LAW 44-56 (1977).
33. "Constitutional law can make no genuine advance until it iso-
lates the problem of rights against the state and makes that problem part
of its own agenda. That argues for a fusion of constitutional law and moral
theory, a connection that, incredibly, has yet to take place."
R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 149 (1982).
34. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 11; Monaghan, supra note 10; see infra
Part II. B. 3.
35. Brest, supra note 7, at 234.
36. See, e.g., Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L.
REV. 1 (1934); Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence - The Next Step, 30
COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930).
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prior restraints 7 In truth, no theory of constitutional adjudi-
cation based on something other than past judicial perform-
ance can comfortably accommodate precedent."
One school of constitutional law writing however, seems
to have a role for precedent integrated into its central thesis.
The Legal Process school, while not committed to anything
like a strong form of stare decisis, advocates a common-law-
like advance of constitutional jurisprudence, fusing elements
of interpretivist and noninterpretivist argument. 9 A linchpin
of the Legal Process tradition is Professor Herbert Wechs-
ler's articulation of the need for "neutral principles" of con-
stitutional adjudication.4 ° Wechsler, replying largely to
Hand, 41 expressly forswore reliance on judicial precedent or
historical understanding as an ultimate test. 42 The criterion
he urged was that judicial decisionmaking "must be genu-
inely principled, resting with respect to every step that is in-
volved in reaching judgment on analysis and reasons quite
transcending the immediate result .... -4 Wechsler ac-
corded presumptive weight to both history and precedent,
but he wished judges bound by neither, asking instead that
reasoning of general application be the yardstick by which ju-
dicial success was measured.44
Wechsler's article spawned a considerable literature.
Some of it cogently points out the modesty of the neutral
principles requirement. 4 Other works have built on or ar-
37. See Brest, supra note 7, at 205:
The modes of nonoriginalist adjudication defended in this article
accord the text and original history presumptive weight, but do
not treat them as authoritative or binding. The presumption is de-
feasible over time in the light of changing experiences and
perceptions.
38. Monaghan, Tribe, and Brest all give some weight to precedent,
but then must explain departure from it, given that precedent does not
provide the ultimate test. The issue for them all is what "trumps" prece-
dent and how easily (face cards only? all clubs? only the one-eyed jacks?).
39. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); H.
HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS (tent. ed. 1958); Bickel & Wellington,
Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV.
L. REV. 1 (1957); Wellington, supra note 26.
40. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
41. Id. at 2-3.
42. Id. at 16-17.
43. Id. at 15.
44. Id. at 16-17.
45. E.g., Greenawalt, supra note 14, at 1013.
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gued against some application of it.46 More than a few have
taken issue with the notion of neutrality, although this disa-
greement seems not to be with Wechsler but with a value-
neutral thesis not his.4 Of special note for my purposes is the
1971 article by Professor (now Judge) Robert Bork on "Neu-
tral Principles and some First Amendment Problems." '48 Bork
assimilated the neutral principles requirement of generality
to strong adherence to historical command as the only legiti-
mate source for such principles.49 In so doing, Bork essen-
tially turned Wechsler's position on its head. In place of neu-
tral principles as the guarantors of evolving constitutional
doctrine based on more than instinctive reaction to particular
controversies, Bork mandated a sort of neutral principle in-
compatible with judicial supervision of change. Bork declares
that "[w]here constitutional materials do not clearly specify the
value to be preferred, there is no principled way to prefer
any claimed human value to any other."5 Bork refers to his
"extension" of the Wechslerian concept as a requirement of
neutrality in the derivation and definition, as well as the ap-
plication, of legal principles. 1 His approach not only em-
braces the Hand position against which Wechsler argued, it
goes further, forcing a static quality on the Constitution even
where a contrary intent of the framers can be found. If it
were determined that the framers intended, say, the scope of
First Amendment protections to change over time, no gen-
eral principle of historical derivation would be available for
judicial guidance. Bork's position suggests that no legitimate
judicial action is possible in such circumstances. 2
46. See, e.g., E. ROSTOW, THE SOVEREIGN PREROGATIVE THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE QUEST FOR LAW 33 (1962); Freund, Rationality in Judicial
Decisions, RATIONAL DECISION: NoMos VII 109, 111, 119-20 (C. Friedrich
ed. 1964); Levi, The Nature of Judicial Reasoning, LAW AND PHIL. 263, 274-
76 (S. Hook ed. 1964).
47. E.g., Miller & Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Ad-
judication, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 661, 663 (1960) (because they cannot identify
"objective standards," judges cannot be neutral); Miller & Scheflin, The
Power of the Supreme Court in the Age of the Positive State: A Preliminary Excur-
sus Part One: On Candor and the Court, Or, Why Bamboozle the Natives?, 1967
DUKE L. J. 273, 281 n. 27 (principled decision proponents "are calling for a
return to mechanical jurisprudence . . ." ).
48. Bork, Neutral Principles and some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L. J. 1 (1971).
49. Id. at 3-4, 8.
50. Id. at 8 (emphasis supplied).
51. Id. at 7.
52. Id. at 10-11.
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C. Proceduralism
Bork's particular brand of interpretivism highlights the
role of change in the interpretive debate. Although some-
thing of a simplification, interpretivism can be viewed as
designed to resist, noninterpretivism to facilitate, change in
the construction of constitutional commands.5" Most inter-
pretivist approaches, however, provide a sort of "flex-joint"
that allows constitutional dogma to bend with the times if an
historical intent to that effect can be found. 5 Some scholars
have suggested that this intent in fact informed the framing
of some clauses but not others.5 5 The contrasting judicial in-
terpretations of the Seventh and Eighth Amendments con-
form to this suggestion,56 although some scholars find little
historical support for an evolutionary Eighth and revolution-
ary (war-era) Seventh. 57 Whatever view one takes of such par-
ticular provisions, the debate over general principles of con-
stitutional adjudication must be seen in large measure as a
debate over the desirability of judicially-sponsored change.
The qualifier "judicially-sponsored" is critical to this de-
bate. For Bork, Hand, and other interpretivists, legal change
to meet contemporary values is surely appropriate. But the
institutional progenitors of such change must be legislatures,
not courts.58 This, they say, is the American constitutional
53. Compare, e.g., Monaghan, supra note 10, at 374 ("For us, the
problem is how to insulate the Framers' policy choices from being over-
riden [sic] by a subsequent majority of the supreme court.") With Brest,
supra note 7, at 225 ("We did not adopt the Constitution, and those who
did are dead and gone").
54. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 6, at 13-14; Linde, supra note 3, at
254-55
55. ELY supra note 6, at 13-14.
56. The Seventh Amendment states that "[i]n suits at common law,
... the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . ." The amendment
does not by its terms extend this guarantee to suits in equity. The Court
generally applies an historical test to determine whether the amendment
applies to a particular claim: was the claim one that would have been
brought at common law in 1791, when the amendment was adopted? See,
e.g., Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1958). The Court
has not felt so bound to history in applying the Eighth Amendment's pro-
hibition of "cruel and unusual punishments." Whether the challenged pun-
ishment fits within the Amendment's prohibition is determined by refer-
ence to "evolving standards of decency," not merely to a list of
punishments meted out in the late eighteenth century. See, e.g., Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
57. See, e.g., Monaghan, supra note 10, at 362-67.
58. See, e.g., HAND supra note 8, at 66-77; Bork, supra note 11, at 2-
3, 5-6, 10; Monaghan, supra note 10, at 370-71.
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design: Political decisions are generally committed to
majoritarian processes. Judicial review is anomalous, given
our basic system of government. Thus, it must be kept within
narrow bounds.59
This argument from democracy,"° while superficially ap-
pealing, is rife with difficulties. One is that the social contract
theory underlying the argument61 also provides a large loop-
hole in it. If we generally wish to be governed by a majority
but allow some majority decisions to be overturned by an-
timajoritarian judicial processes, it must be because we do not
wish fully to be governed by majoritarian processes. The the-
sis that makes court decisions anomalous, thus, is overbroad.
Once it is narrowed, it becomes wholly uninformative: we
wish majoritarian processes to make some but not all deci-
sions. This point is never disputed. But the interpretivist in-
variably follows its recognition by declaring, again, that the
courts must circumscribe their decisionmaking so as not to
trench on the general freedom of the current majority to
shape their own destiny.62 The point, of course, could be
made with equal logic the other way around.
Among the better known efforts to meet this difficulty is
Dean John Hart Ely's proceduralist theory in his book, De-
mocracy and Distrust.63 Ely offers the following explanation for
the roles of legislature and court:
In a representative democracy value determinations are to
be made by our elected representatives, and if in fact most
of us disapprove we can vote them out of office. Malfunc-
tion occurs when the process is undeserving of trust, when
(1) the ins are choking off the channels of political change
to insure that they will stay in and the outs will stay out, or
(2) though no one is actually denied a voice or a vote, rep-
resentatives beholden to an effective majority are systemati-
cally disadvantaging some minority out of simple hostility
59. See, e.g., HAND, supra note 8, at 66-77; Bork, supra note 11, at 8
("[A] court that makes rather than implements value choices cannot be
squared with the presuppositions of a democratic society.")
60. Credit for this phrase goes to Professor Frederick Schauer. See
F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSPHICAL ENQUIRY 35-46 (1982).
61. Bork refers to this model of "popular consent to limited govern-
ment," which includes both majoritarian and countermajoritarian ele-
ments, as "Madisonian." See Bork, supra note 11, at 2-3.
62. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 11, at 10-11 ("Courts must accept any
value choice the legislature makes unless it clearly runs contrary to a choice
made in the framing of the Constitution.")
63. Supra note 4.
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or of prejudiced refusal to recognize commonalities of in-
terests, and thereby denying that minority the protection
afforded other groups by a representative system.
Obviously, our elected representatives are the last per-
sons we should trust with identification of either of these
situations. 64
This is however, a task " 'peculiarly suited to the capabilities
of the courts.' 65 By turning over to courts the role of polic-
ing such procedural defaults, Ely says, we resolve the anomaly
of judicial review. 6 Courts merely make sure the process
works. Legislatures do the rest.
Ely's work, like Wechsler's, has created a minor industry
among legal academics.67 The major problems with the
proceduralist approach have been cogently stated else-
where.6 8 Rather than rehearse them, I will use Ely's argu-
ment for a different end. The main appeal of a proceduralist
approach is that it permits one to begin discussion of judicial
role by explicitly acknowledging that our political processes
are neither fully majoritarian nor would complete majoritari-
anism fully satisfy us. We (allow me the ambiguous pronoun)
have majoritarian processes that do not always replicate ma-
jority will. And, even when it does, the majority is sometimes
nasty.
Both of these departures from the nice democratic
processes Ely desires doubtless exist. Public choice theorists
over the past quarter century have demonstrated a variety of
ways in which even the most aggressively egalitarian
processes may fail to produce results consistent with majority
preferences. 9 They also have persuasively shown, what
64. Id. at 103.
65. Id. (quoting A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 24
(1962).)
66. Id. at 101-04.
67. See Estreicher, Review Essay, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547 n. 4 (1981)
for a partial list, which includes twelve individual articles and two symposia.
The flood of commentary on Professor Ely's work has by no means abated
since that list was published.
68. E.g., Lupu, Book Review: Choosing Heroes Carefully, 15 HARV. C.R.
- C.L. L. REV. 779 (1980); Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based
Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L. J. 1063 (1980); Tushnet: Darkness on the
Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89
YALE L.J. 1037.
69. Perhaps the most obvious example is the problem presented by
direct popular election of representatives. See, e.g., S. BRAMS & P. FISHBURN,
APPROVAL VOTING 35-56, 73-106 (1983). The literature respecting decision-
making in a direct democracy is usefully summarized and critiqued in D.
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surely would have been no surprise to James Madison,7" that
our constitutional processes for consideration of popular
preferences can lead to considerable divergence of represen-
tative decisionmaking from majoritarian desires.71 Take al-
most any government program at random, and a "special in-
terest" counter-majoritarian explanation can be found that is
more plausible than the public interest justification for it.72
Ely sees at least some subset of these departures from
(unprejudiced) majority will as process errors in need of judi-
cial correction.7 3 Yet, one cannot, without specifying a num-
ber of substantive values whose sources then become prob-
lematic, identify when departures from good majoritarian
decisionmaking have occurred. 74 Ely's approach does not pro-
vide real guidance for determining when legislative choices
should be struck down because they deprive some persons of
meaningful participation or are based on prejudice. These
choices will, of necessity, closely resemble ordinary decisions
of our representative-political processes. Proceduralism, like
other approaches, cannot resolve the argument over the
proper scope of constitutional adjudication.
II. LIBERTY AND THE NEW LIBERTY
The lack of satisfying criteria of constitutional interpre-
tation is the critical problem for discussion of the due process
clauses. The debate over the respective spheres of legislative
and judicial decisionmaking in particular has been a source of
difficulty in the due process argument.75 Quite plainly, the
MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 19-67 (1979).
70. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 20, 51, 55 (J. Madison).
71. See generally M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965);
TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY (J. Buchanan, R. Tollison
& G. Tullock, eds., 1980).
72. See Gellhorn, The Abuse of Occupational Licensing, 44 U. CHI. L.
REV. 6 (1976); Jarrell, The Demand for State Regulation of the Electric Utility
Industry, 20 J. L. & ECON. 269 (1977); Peltzman, Toward A More General
Theory of Economic Regulation, 19 J. L. & ECON. 211 (1976); Spann & Erik-
son, The Economics of Railroading: The Beginning of Cartelization and Regula-
tion, 1 BELL J. ECON. & MGT. Sci. 227 (1970); Stigler, The Theory of Economic
Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGT. Sci. 3 (1971); Weingast, Shepsle, and
Johnson, The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs, 89 J. POL. ECON. 642
(1981).
73. ELY, supra note 6, at 135-79.
74. See, e.g., Lupu, supra note 68, at 782, 785, 789; Tribe, supra
note 68, at 1064, 1073-77; Tushnet, supra note 68, at 1051-53.
75. See, e.g., Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225-29 (1976) ("[T]o
hold as we are urged to do that any substantial deprivation imposed by
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constitutional mandate (unless one wishes to reconsider Mar-
bury) is for some legislative and some judicial authority to de-
termine the liberty enjoyed by individuals. No general resolu-
tion of the appropriate limits of each authority, however, is
possible. The due process argument begins with efforts, simi-
lar to those above, to promote some resolution of the contro-
versy, drawing this time on the text and structure of the due
process clauses. The argument runs under two different
headings: "substance" and "process. ' 76 Properly understood,
both involve the same questions.
A. Positivism: A Bitter Mousetrap
The major focus of recent scholarship concerning the
due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
is the identification of distinctive legislative and judicial
roles. 77 Beginning in 1970 with its decision in Goldberg v.
Kelly,78 the Supreme Court began tracing a wavering line
through government administrative, 79 regulatory,80 and pro-
prison authorities triggers the procedural protections of the Due Process
clause would subject to judicial review a wide spectrum of discretionary
actions that traditionally have been the business of prison administrators
rather than of the federal courts."); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 349,
350 n. 14 (1976) ("The federal court is not the appropriate forum in which
to review the multitude of personnel decisions that are made daily by pub-
lic agencies . . . . [U]timate control of state personnel relationships is, and
will remain, with the States; they may grant or withhold tenure at their
unfettered discretion."); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 152-54 (1974)
(plurality op. of Rehnquist, J.) ("To conclude otherwise would require us to
hold that although Congress chose to enact what was essentially a legisla-
tive compromise, . . . it was constitutionally disabled from making such a
choice . . . . Neither the language of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment nor our cases construing it require any such hobbling restric-
tions on legislative authority in this area.").
76. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)
(discussing substantive limitations of due process); Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319 (1976) (discussing procedural limitations of due process).
77. See, e.g., Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 Sup. CT.
REV. 85; Laycock, Due Process and Separation of Powers: The Effort to Make the
Due Process Clauses Nonjusticiable, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 875 (1982); Monaghan,
Of "Liberty" and "Property", 62 CORNELL L. REV. 405 (1977).
78. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
79. E.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (cancellation of
Social Security disability benefits); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389
(1971). (denial of claim for Social Security disability benefits).
80. E.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (distribution of police
flyer portraying respondent as a shoplifter); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535
(1971) (suspension of uninsured motorist's driver's license, where motorist
did not post bond equal to accident victim's unadjudicated claims).
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prietary1 actions. Its two-step process called for it, first, to
identify the existence or absence of liberty or property inter-
ests sufficient to trigger the due process clauses. 2 Second, the
Court decided what process was due.8 In Goldberg, Justice
Brennan's majority opinion observed that no question had
been raised concerning the necessity of reaching the second
issue. 8' The particular phrasing of that observation, however,
adumbrated future developments. Brennan stated that the
benefits at stake were "a matter of statutory entitlement for
persons qualified to receive them"8 5 and added in a footnote,
"[i]t may be realistic today to regard welfare entitlements as
more like 'property' than a 'gratuity.' "8 He supported this
assertion by reference to the writings of Professor Charles
Reich.8 7 The Court returned to the process of defining lib-
erty and property in a succession of 1970's cases.8 8 Its prop-
erty decisions seemed to turn on whether claimants had been
deprived of rights created by the other branches of govern-
ment. 9 The Court's treatment of liberty was more equivocal
81. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976) (termination of employ-
ment as city policeman); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (dismissal
of nonprobationary federal employee from competitive civil service job);
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (state university's refusal to
rehire assistant professor after fixed one year term of employment had
expired).
82. E.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599-603 (1972) (long-
term teacher's expectation of continued employment based on state's de
facto tenure system could constitute protected property interest); Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-78 (no protected liberty or property
interest in being rehired after completion of one year teaching contract at
state university).
83. E.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-49 (1976) (admin-
istrative procedures preceding termination of Social Security disability pay-
ments satisfied procedural due process requirements; full evidentiary hear-
ing prior to termination was unnecessary); Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471, 483-90 (1972) (laying out basic requirements for parole revocation
hearing).
84. 397 U.S. at 261 ("Appellant does not contend that procedural
due process is not applicable to the termination of welfare benefits.").
85. Id. at 262.
86. Id. at 262 n. 8.
87. Id. citing Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerg-
ing Legal Issues, 74 YALE L. J. 1245, 1255 (1965); Reich, The New Property,
73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). Reich's work has been widely recognized by com-
mentators as well and proves the springboard for the original paper writ-
ten by Professors Terrell and Butler, The New Liberty: Philosophical and His-
torical Perspectives on a Fundamental Constitutional Value.
88. See cases cited supra notes 79-81.
89. E.g., Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976) (unsuccessful attempt
to ground property right to continued employment as city policeman on
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regarding the scope of government power to determine when
the clauses' protections were triggered.9"
While the role for legislative definition of rights has
sparked controversy, the more hotly contested issue is legisla-
tive definition of remedies.9 The pivot point for the argu-
discharge provision of local ordinance); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976) (interest in continued receipt of medical disability benefits from So-
cial Security Administration constitutes protected property interest); Perry
v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 503 (1972) (claim to job tenure based on de facto
tenure policy of state college system could constitute protected property
interest); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (no property in-
terest in continued employment by state university beyond one-year
appointment).
90. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 746, 753-70 (1982) (state
may not terminate fundamental parental rights without meeting at least
"clear and convincing" standard of proof of parents' neglect; statutory
standard of "fair preponderence of the evidence" denied parents due pro-
cess); Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 27-33 (1981)
(state's pecuniary interest in not appointing counsel to represent mother in
parental rights termination hearing was insufficient to outweigh mother's
interest in preserving her parental rights; federal district court did not err,
however, in refusing to appoint counsel in this case); Vitek v. Jones, 445
U.S. 480, 487-91 (1980) (state statute Igranted prisoner a protected liberty
interest in not being transferred to mental hospital without finding of
mental illness untreatable in penal institution; state procedures for reach-
ing the determination did not meet due process requirements); Greenholtz
v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 11-16 (1979) (state parole board
procedures for deciding whether to grant parole satisfied due process re-
quirements triggered by inmates' expectation of parole based on statutory
provision), Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-29 (1976) (neither the
Constitution nor state law granted prisoner any protected liberty interest
in not being transferred to another prison; due process requirements not
triggered; transfer decision was properly within state prison authorities'
discretion); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-60 (1974) (state proce-
dures for determining whether prisoner was guilty of serious misconduct
warranting forfeiture of good time credits did not satisfy due process re-
quirements triggered by statutorily created liberty interest); Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480-84 (1972) (due process prohibits state from ter-
minating parolee's "conditional liberty" interest without conducting at
least an informal hearing beforehand); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400
U.S. 433, 436-39 (1971) (police posting of notice portraying appellee as
excessive drinker, pursuant to state statute but without prior hearing, con-
stituted deprivation of liberty interest without due process of law).
91. See, e.g., TRIBE supra note 28, at 532-39; Easterbrook, supra note
77; Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975); Grey,
Procedural Fairness and Substantive Rights, DUE PROCESS: NOMOS XVIII 182
(1977); Laycock, supra note 77; Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The
Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U.L. REV. 885 (1981); Michelman, Formal
and Associational Aims in Procedural Due Process, DUE PROCESS: NOMOS XVIII
126 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman Ed. 1977); Monaghan, supra note 77; Van
Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property": Adjudicative Due Process in the Admin-
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ment is Justice Rehnquist's position in Arnett v. Kennedy that,
where legislation identified both rights and remedies, he
would not "conclude that the substantive right may be
viewed wholly apart from the procedure provided for its en-
forcement." '92 The actual property right there at issue was
not, according to Rehnquist, the right to employment unless
there is "cause" for termination, "but such a guarantee as
enforced by the procedures which Congress has designated
for the determination of cause." '93 The pithy encapsulation of
this position was Rehnquist's declaration that: "where the
grant of a substantive right is inextricably intertwined with
the limitations on the procedures which are to be employed
in determining that right, a litigant . . must take the bitter
with the sweet." 94
The Rehnquist position has been labelled a "positivist
trap." 95 According to some commentators, it threatens to
swallow the due process clauses, reducing them to the tauto-
logical proposition that you get what the legislature gives
you.9" If a constitutionally cognizable liberty or property in-
terest has been invaded (itself a matter of legislative decision),
the procedure due is whatever the legislature prescribed.97
The attack on Rehnquist, however, has a major diffi-
culty. Rehnquist offers a coherent analytical construct. It is
the combination of two propositions not readily challenged:
istrative State 62 CORNELL L. REV. 445 (1977); Williams, Liberty and Property:
The Problem of Government Benefits, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 3 (1983).
92. 416 U.S. 134, 152 (1974).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 153-54. This position received ambiguous support from
the Court over the next decade but was explicitly rejected by the Court in
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, - U.S. , 105 S.Ct. 1487,
1492-93 (1985).
95. Mashaw, supra n. 91, at 885, 888-95 (1981); see also L. TRIBE,
supra note 28, at 533-35.
96. E.g., Leubsdorf, Constitutional Civil Procedure, 63 TEx. L. REV.
579, 583 (1984); Mashaw, supra note 91, at 889-95; Michelman, supra note
91; Monaghan, supra note 91, at 438-43; Tribe, supra note 68, at 1070.
97. The formulation given in the text is the usual statement of Jus-
tice Rehnquist's position. See, e.g., Leubsdorf, supra note 96, at Part II.
B.I.; Mashaw, supra note 91, at 889-95; Michelman, supra note 91. Rehn-
quist's actual statements are not quite so bold. His language in Arnett, for
instance, emphasizes the simultaneous creation and inextricable intertwin-
ing of the "substantive right" with the "procedures which are to be em-
ployed in determining that right." 416 U.S. 134, at 151-54. Rehnquist
does not, however, indicate how one determines when rights are inextrica-
bly intertwined with processes or the precise significance of the spatial or
temporal proximity of legislative provisions respecting these matters.
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greater powers generally include lesser powers; and substance
and process are related. Given the current approach to lib-
erty and property, Rehnquist seems to be on solid ground. If
liberty and property are to be determined by reference to
positive law, why should the process for inquiry into their
deprivation be different?
Professor Douglas Laycock's insistence that the due pro-
cess clauses' wording provides a ready answer is incomplete.
Laycock argues:
The syntax of the due process clauses indicates that "life,
liberty, or property" is quite different from "due process."
First, we determine if "life, liberty or property" is being
taken; if so, then and only then do we determine what "due
process" is required before the taking. . . . [T]he structure
of the sentence tells us that two separate concepts are being
discussed. 98
True enough, but this does not meet Rehnquist's point. In
whatever class of cases the legislature is allowed to determine
the scope of constitutionally protected life,9 9 liberty, or prop-
erty, no process is due unless the legislature says so.'00 If this
"resurrects" the right-privilege distinction1"' (as though that
ever left us), 02 so does the acknowledgment of legislative
98. Laycock, supra note 77 at 879.
99. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See also Belloti v. Baird,
443 U.S. 642 (1979); Anders v. Floyd, 440 U.S. 445 (1979); Colaretti v.
Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979); Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Connecticut v. Menellio, 423 U.S. 9 (1975);
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
100. The legislature plainly may define away process rights in these
cases, even under the views of Rehnquist's detractors, by withholding pro-
tection of "substantive" interests. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 77, at
87-88; Grey, supra note 91, at 190-201.
101.- Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Consti-
tutional Law, 81 HARv. L. REV. 143 (1968).
102. Assertion that the right-privilege distinction was replaced by the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions seems to me misguided. Under ei-
ther approach, the question really is the scope of the asserted right.
Whether right A (say, freedom of speech) is allegedly violated by the state's
imposition on interest B (wealth, possession of a job, food stamps) does not
depend on whether B is labelled a right or a privilege. The label is short-
hand for a conclusion that a given interference with B is permissible except
insofar as it may violate right A. This reasoning is not different in uncon-
stitutional condition cases, such as Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963), and right-privilege cases, such as United Public Workers v. Mitch-
ell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947). Our view of government employment has changed
less since Mitchell than has our substantive first amendment jurisprudence.
See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); United States Civil Service
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competence to create property.
The real objection to Rehnquist's formulation is that, to
keep it from swallowing the clauses whole, one must identify
the cases in which legislative choice cannot define the scope
of substantive rights. This is an uncomfortable focus for those
who would read the clauses expansively. The only territory
relatively easy to defend would place the line of judicially
vouchsafed liberty at the absence of physical restraint and
would protect against legislative incursion only property that
is tangible and physically possessed by the claimant. 0 3 This
position, however, returns us to the argument over constitu-
tional adjudication and change. By what standard do we jus-
tify drawing the lines here? Is textual-historical or inten-
tional-historical accuracy enough? What of the contrary
precedents? Of contemporary values? If most argument over
the positivist position seems controlled by views of relative
legislative and judicial competence, any attempt to resolve
the argument clearly implicates all of the issues of interpreta-
tion that so long have resisted taming.
B. The New Liberty: Clause for Concern
1. The Argument for Liberty
The papers by Professors Terrell and Butler may be seen
as an effort to avoid these problems. They come at the due
process clauses sideways, starting with the notion of liberty
and only later addressing its functional context. The paper by
Professor Terrell" 4 begins with an argument for taking an
expansive view of liberty, 0 5 a view Professor Butler seems to
share.10 6 Terrell gives liberty far greater scope than mere
freedom from physical restraint. Rather, he views it as a gen-
Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973); Pickering
v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
103. See Monaghan, supra note 75, at 424-26; Shattuck, The True
Meaning of the Term "Liberty" in Those Clauses in the Federal and State Consti-
tutions Which Protect "Life, Liberty, and Property", 4 HARv. L. REV. 365
(1891); Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39
HARV. L. REv. 431, 439-40 (1926); Williams, supra note 91, at 20-21.
104. Terrell, Liberty: The Concept and Its Constitutional Context 1 No-
TRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y. 545 (1985) [hereinafter Terreli]. The
paper defines "liberty" at page 554 and discusses liberty's place in due pro-
cess analysis beginning at page 578.
105. Id. at 554-573.
106. See generally, Butler, Compensable Liberty: A Historical and Political
Model of the Seventh Amendment Public Law Jury, 1 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics
& Pub. Pol'y. 595 (1985) [hereinafter Butler].
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eral absence of human interference with individual choice. 10 7
He limits this broad concept with a requirement that liberty
not include choices that produce direct and foreseeable harm
to others.1 08 Obviously, this approach leaves the contours of
liberty a trifle vague. The more precise definition of liberty
and the determination when and on what terms it can be
taken to serve other public ends are left to judicial determi-
nation. Professor Butler, perhaps to minimize the appearance
of removing large areas of decision from representative
processes and committing them to non-representative judicial
processes, draws another line. Judges are only allowed to
draw clear, liberty-protective lines between permitted and
proscribed governmental interference with liberty. But it is
for juries, our compromise between representation and elit-
ism, to determine when a permitted interference imposes suf-
ficiently on an individual to require public compensation for
his lost liberty.'0 9
When considered together, the thesis presented by
Professors Terrell and Butler rests on three structural sup-
ports. I will do violence here to their order of presentation
but not, I hope, to their content. First, Terrell and Butler
provide a normative basis. As governmental power has
grown, the need for counterweights to it has grown corre-
spondingly. One aspect of this need is our increased insis-
tence on broadened and more fully equalized opportunity for
participation in representative selection. Another aspect is an
expansion in the protections accorded individual liberty. Ter-
rell's and Butler's arguments, thus, have at their root the no-
tion that constitutional change is a natural by-product of so-
cial change. The notion of a constant quantum of liberty is a
picturesque way of capturing the social imperative for ex-
panding constitutional protection. " I cannot, however, resist
noting that the raw score for liberty may not be the only rele-
vant number. One wag observed on a perhaps analogous mat-
ter that "the sum of the intelligence on the planet is a con-
stant," but added, "the population is growing.""'
107. Terrell at 554-567. But see his discussion of nonhuman con-
straints beginning at 567.
108. Id. at 554.
109. Butler at 649-651.
110. Cf., Terrell at 587., In the original paper, the proposition was
put thusly: "fIf the] constituent variables [of liberty] could be quantified
.... the 'total amount' of liberty we have enjoyed over the life of our
Constitution has remained roughly constant."
111. "Mr. Cole's Axiom" was a product of Arthur Block (c 1980),
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Given the need for a progressive interpretation, the pa-
pers' second structural feature follows readily. That is their
noninterpretive-textual approach to the concept of liberty.
Terrell and Butler take a current-usage, contemporary-un-
derstanding approach to the constitutional text. Liberty,
thus, becomes for each generation whatever we think of it as
today.
The third support seems out of keeping with the first
two. It is an interpretivist approach that fuses intentional-his-
torical and structural-historical elements. The tension inher-
ent in this approach may help explain the surgical separation
of two papers that, when one, appeared as siblings joined at
the staple."1 2 The historical finding is that liberty was not a
static but a dynamic concept, protection of which was com-
mitted mainly to juries. The commitment to juries was in-
tended to secure the counterweight against legislative con-
duct's centripetal force, juries being deemed less likely to
defer to political decisionmakers than judges." 3 The inter-
pretivist approach in Professor Butler's paper results in the
general devolution upon juries of the function of construing
the due process clause, expecting that juries both will and
should perform that function as does Professor Terrell's
analysis, in a noninterpretivist fashion.
2. New Liberty: A Jury-rigged Concept
The articles by Terrell and Butler are but two of a num-
ber of recent efforts to strengthen judicial tools for invalidat-
ing legislative actions. Some have focused on expanding the
scope of "individual liberty," for instance, under the First
who included it in a calendar marketed by Price, Stern, Sloan Publishers,
Inc. By the way, this axiom was the daily saying for Monday, April 27,
1981.
112. Indeed, in the paper submitted for comment, the authors admit-
ted that the two parts of the paper were written by them separately, a fact
underscored by their use of different typefaces. There are more than a few
tensions between the two papers as they now have developed, but what
originally appeared as a single joint product still in many ways fits together
as a package. Despite the voluminous historical argument he now has mar-
shaled, Professor Butler, like Professor Terrell, favors a relatively expan-
sive protection of "liberty," not metered in any serious way by historical
bounds around its substantive definition. The routes to this solution and
the mechanics of its implementation may differ for the two of them, but
Professors Terrell and Butler do not differ fundamentally on the degree of
constraint appropriate to constitutional protection of liberty.
113. Butler at 751-752.
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and Fourth Amendments." 4 Others have endeavored to in-
crease the protection of "economic freedoms" by reinter-
preting the contracts clause"1 ' or the eminent domain
clause"16 or by returning to old-style substantive due pro-
cess. " 7 Terrell and Butler's approach, although more ambig-
uous in its origins and effects, seems moved by instincts com-
mon to many of these other efforts. Its particular details raise
a host of questions. Its normative basis, for one thing, like
one heavily advertised brassiere, lacks visible means of sup-
port.11 Nor do Terrell and Butler provide a cogent explana-
tion for selecting their peculiar mix of interpretivist and
noninterpretivist approaches. They may, understandably,
wish to avoid lengthy debate over such issues, but the inter-
pretive criteria are too closely bound up with normative
premises and ultimate dispositions for their selection to pass
without explication. These matters already have been ad-
dressed a propos the general interpretive dilemma.
Two aspects of the approach, however, call for more spe-
114. See, e.g., Arenella, Foreword: Rethinking the Functions of Criminal
Procedure: The Warren and Burger Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L. J.
185 (1983); Baker, The Process of Change and the Liberty Theory of the First
Amendment, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 293 (1981).
115. L. TRIBE, supra note 28, at 471; Epstein, Revitalizing the Contracts
Clause (Sept. 1983) (unpublished manuscript). See also Allied Structural
Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S.234 (1978); United States Trust Co. of
N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
116. Epstein, Taxation, Regulation, and Confiscation, 20 OSGOODE HALL
L.J. 433 (1982) (Taxation); Epstein, Not Deference But Doctrine: The Eminent
Domain Clause, 1982 SUp. CT. REV. 351 (Eminent Domain).
117. Tushnet, supra note 31.
118. It is not clear if the link between increased governmental power
and heightened protection of liberty is being represented as a generally
accepted norm, or simply the authors'. The growth of government may for
many people imply greater need for protection of liberty. It also may imply
greater willingness to tolerate governmental infringement on what Terrell
and Butler define as liberty. The expansion in governmental provisions for
individual welfare can be viewed as a beneficial development, demonstrat-
ing the wisdom of deference to legislative authority. The increased possi-
bility for abuse that accompanies any increase in government largesse does
not necessarily indicate that citizens will be more concerned over the possi-
ble abuses-such abuses of power may matter less than the assertion of
authority by a government of only limited and sporadic involvement in its
citizens' lives. That the exercise of government power today increasingly
needs to be checked certainly is defensible as an individual value-judgment.
But it is not clearly sustainable against contrary value-judgment, nor is it
subject to proof as a reflection of popular sentiment. If the imperfection of
representative processes precludes claiming popular support for whatever
mix of liberty and restraint government now provides, there still is no em-
pirical basis for a general assertion to the contrary.
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cific discussion. Both derive from Professor Butler's paper.
One is the notion that juries are the best vehicles for decid-
ing the appropriate scope of individual liberty. The other is
the notion, common to several of the new economic freedom
constructs, that compensation rather than prohibition should
play the dominant remedial role. The two notions cannot be
separated entirely; identification of the decisionmaker has im-
portant implications for the impact of a compensation rule.
Integral to the reliance on juries is Butler's assumption
that juries are more liberty-protective than judges. Butler ad-
verts to the controversy over jury-trial in sedition proceed-
ings." 9 Indeed, decision by jury has been considered a criti-
cally important protection in areas such as treason and
seditious libel where the interests of those who are "in the
system" collide directly with the interests of other individu-
als. 20 In seditious libel, for example, government officers
bring suit against individuals who have insulted, abused, or
criticized them. 2 While there may not be an identity of in-
terests among government officials, including judges, there is
obvious reason for suspicion that those "in authority" may be
less inclined to protect the liberties of obstreperous outsiders
than might a panel of relatively disinterested jurors.'22 But
can the same be said in other areas of liberty? Will juries be
more liberty-protective than judges, say, in the usual defama-
tion case? Or in the usual obscenity case? Or where restric-
tions on entry to a learned profession are challenged? Will
the general populace be more sympathetic than judges to
Communists, or to homosexuals? 23 There is a reason why the
right to jury trial was a matter of great moment only in so
limited a realm.
The use of juries under Professor Butler's scheme, thus,
119. Butler at 721.
120. See, e.g., Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on the Central
Meaning of the First Amendment, 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191. In 1792, the right
to jury definition of seditious libel was established in England by Fox's Li-
bel Act after a prolonged dispute. 32 GEO. 3, c. 60 (1792).
121. See Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 497-516
(1948).
122. Cf Cass, First Amendment Access to Government Facilities, 65 VA. L.
REV. 1287, 1329 n. 207 (1979) (udicial response to criticism).
123. See Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72
YALE L.J. 877, 889-893 (1963) (general distaste for allowing dissenters free-
dom to speak makes difficult the protection of unpopular groups through
mechanisms such as jury trial); Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process",
83 HARV. L. REV. 518, 522-24 (1970) (judges peculiarly able to discern and
protect the speech values in areas such as obscenity).
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may cut against the very liberties he and Professor Terrell
seek to protect. More important, by freeing juries from
judges' control, that scheme is likely to have pernicious re-
sults. Juries would become to a significant degree the arbiters
of social value. They would fix the price tag for legislative
programs. And they would be free to do so without any as-
certainable standards. Courts may not do a very good job of
articulating the reasons for their actions. 24 The fidelity of
judge to precedent at best emulates current marital norms.'25
But courts do indicate some basis for their judgments, and
their decisions, in the main, conform to general patterns, so
that informed prediction of judicial reaction is possible within
large areas. Legislators may not know whether a given exer-
cise of power will be struck down, but most lawyers, at least,
can do a fairly good handicapping job for judicial outcomes.
Juries are notoriously different. The point is not that ju-
ries are completely unpredictable. Rather, it is that jury fidel-
ity to legal standards is a "sometime thing." '26 The concept
of "jury nullification' 71 in criminal law is apposite. Juries are
commonly thought to reach results utterly inconsistent with
the legal rules and evidence in particular cases."' Because
criminal conviction potentially entails an extreme imposition
on individual liberty, we allow juries to acquit for any rea-
son." 9 We do not, however, allow them to convict notwith-
standing the evidence. And in some cases, for instance those
involving the death penalty, distrust of the basis for their
choices leads us to confine jury discretion for lenience as well
as harshness. 30
124. This criticism is a standard complaint of legal academics. Nearly
any law review article, chosen at random, should furnish ample
documentation.
125. See, e.g., Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARv. L.
REV. 802 (1982).
126. Apologies to DuBose Heyward and George Gershwin.
127. See, e.g., Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right to Say No, 45 CAL.
L. REV. 168 (1972).
128. See, e.g., H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966);
Scheflin, supra note 127; see also United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d
1113, 1130-37 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
129. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 187 (1968); Schef-
lin & Van Dyke, Jury Nullification: The Contours of a Controversy, 43 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 51 (Autumn 1980).
130. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 288 (1972). See also Godfrey v.
Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). The
reasoning in these cases is that absent opportunity for discriminatory leni-
ence no one will be treated with undue harshness. The "death penalty"
cases indicate that while jury discretion must be narrowly confined, it can-
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The jury, in other words, serves more than occasionally
as an irrational dispenser of clemency. It is used for that pur-
pose because the social consensus is that errors of lenience
generally have a smaller negative value than errors of strin-
gency in criminal law."' Plainly, reliance on juries to per-
form this function also reflects disbelief that legal standards
are fully congruent with societal intent. This need not reflect
any distrust of officials, only cognizance of the difficulty of ex
ante rulemaking.182 Indeed, the major protection against er-
ror in the criminal justice system is provided by officials, not
juries, as rules on prosecutorial discretion, directed acquittal,
and related matters indicate.8 8 Consistency and accuracy are
not juries' long suits. Whatever standard we may wish to ob-
tain, conferring a general power of legislative oversight on
juries is unlikely to serve our ends.
3. Compensation: Coping with Pay-In
The more interesting concept comes from Professor But-
ler's conflation of the taking clause of the Fifth Amendment
with the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth.
Outside some undefined group of absolutely proscribed gov-
ernmental actions, he urges a right to compensation for gov-
ernmental actions that require some individuals to make an
"excessive sacrifice" of liberty.'" Compensation is a standard
device for harmonizing different preferences - it can serve
in many settings to make hard choices less hard. 8 For exam-
ple, Professor Richard Epstein has explained how eminent
domain power, if coupled with a complementary compensa-
tion requirement, can promote social good. The condemna-
tion power prevents "hold-outs" (a form of free-riding) from
not be eliminated. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Rob-
erts v. Louisiana, 429 U.S. 325 (1976).
131. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
132. See Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE
L.J. 65 (1983); Ehrlich & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking,
3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974). See also Cass, Allocation of Authority Within Bu-
reaucracies: Agency Review of Adjudication (Mar. 1984).
133. See, e.g., Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller,
477 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1973) (refusing to compel prosecution); Oyler v.
Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962) (rejecting equal protection complaint to exer-
cise of decision to prosecute); Winningham, The Dilemma of the Directed Ac-
quittal, 15 VAND. L. REV. 699 (1962).
134. Butler at 653, 682-692.
135. See, e.g., G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § §
5.1, 5.2 (2d ed. 1975) (discussing the rule of general average contribution).
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discouraging production of public goods.13" Compensation,
however, is a necessary corollary to prevent condemnation
from being used to produce private goods at net social
cost.13 7 More general arguments for compensation have been
made by a succession of eminent economists who developed
various measures of social good, such as Kaldor-Hicks, 38
Scitovsky"' and Samuelson'4" efficiency criteria, based on
the instinct that everyone is better off with a decision from
which winners can compensate losers and each secure a posi-
tive net result.1 4
1
At the same time, compensation principles cannot escape
two problems. The first involves justifying the standard. The
claim for compensation must be established. Kaldor-Hicks,
Scitovsky, and Samuelson criteria are advanced for situations
in which competing preferences are viewed as equal and the
status quo is an acceptable place to be.142 All moves, then,
must be justified by net gain. Implicit in these constructs is
the Paretian ideal, which gives each party the right to veto
change and the correlative right to sell his assent at an ac-
ceptable price.143 Various aspects of this construct may be
challenged. For instance, one may ask why the status quo
should be accepted as the base against which to measure net
benefit. 14 Or one may ask why all preferences should be
weighted equally. 1 5
There are responses to these questions that, if not
unarguable, certainly are intellectually respectable.4 ' They
136. Epstein, Eminent Domain, supra note 116; Epstein, Taxation,
supra note 116.
137. Id.
138. Hicks, The Valuation of Social Income, 7 ECONOMICA 111 (1940).
Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of
Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549 (1939).
139. Scitovsky, A Note on Welfare Propositions in Economics, 9 REV.
ECON. STUD. 77 (1941).
140. Samuelson, Evaluation of Real National Income, 2 OXFORD ECON.
PAPERS 1, 10-11 (1950).
141. The major compensation criteria are summarized and usefully
discussed in A. FELDMAN, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY
138-48 (1980).
142. See, A. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 21-32
(1970).
143. See, e.g., Keenan, Value Maximization and Welfare Theory, 10 J.
LEGAL STUD. 409, 410-12 (1981).
144. See, e.g., Bebchuk, The Pursuit of a Bigger Pie: Can Everyone Expect
a Bigger Slice?, 8 HOF. L. REV. 671, 687-88, 690, 702-09 (1980).
145. See, A. Sen, supra note 142, at 78-88, 197-98.
146. See, e.g., Samuelson, Reaffirming the Existence of Reasonable Berg-
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do not, however, fully explain the choice of a compensation
principle as a constitutional standard. A legitimate query for
all proponents of such principles as constitutional dogma
(Professor Butler included) would be why if the Constitution,
as Justice Holmes said, does not enact Herbert Spencer's So-
cial Statics,4" should it be read as enacting Paul Samuelson's
efficiency criterion?
If the standard is accepted, then one must face the prob-
lem of selecting a mechanism for deciding what social choices
are efficient and for making the compensatory trades. The
various economic compensation principles work well when
the number of participants in decisionmaking and the range
of possible choices are small.'48 As those numbers grow, how-
ever, the difficulties of making a decision place ever more sig-
nificance on the procedural issue: how do we assess what is
the efficient choice, who are the relevant players, who has
"won" and "lost," what should the "losers" receive, and in
what amounts from the various winners? In a complex soci-
ety, the selection of surrogate decisionmakers, and of the
rules by which they decide, dwarfs in importance the identifi-
cation of principles for decision.'49 The controversy over
compensation, in a real sense, converts once again to an argu-
ment over who should have the right to resolve social con-
flicts. As the arguments over constitutional adjudication
make plain, there is no easy answer to this problem. However
well thought out, however elaborately justified, each pro-
posed resolution is problematic.
Even so, Butler seems to have settled on a peculiarly
poor general mechanism for social choice. One feature of
Professor Butler's construct in particular increases the likeli-
hood of effects that cannot be squared with the compensation
principles that arguably provide theoretical support. The sug-
gestion that government be the source of compensation for
impairments of liberty allows negative-sum decisions. Those
who lose most (as the specific jury sees it) may be compen-
sated, but those who gain need not surrender more than a
fraction of the compensatory award. The mass of taxpayers
son-Samuelson Social Welfare Transactions, 44 ECONOMICA 81 (1977).
147. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905), (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
148. See, e.g., D. BLACK, THE THEORY OF COMMITTEES AND ELECTIONS
146-47 (1958) (making the point for unanimous collective choice rules).
149. Much of the literature on point is summarized in D. MUELLER,
supra note 69, at 97-124.
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will pick up most of the tab.150
Figuring out how to make government a positive-sum, N-
person game is a challenge of considerable difficulty. Com-
pensation, even from general tax revenues, at once makes the
recipients better off and at least marginally discourages the
activity that can be predicted to trigger a damage award. 5
But for "wrong" decisions, there would be the added cost of
administering the transfer-payment mechanism. That cost
would have to be compared to the savings from the deterrent
effect of the damage suit.
For many of the new compensation rights, Professor But-
ler's included, this administrative cost will not be inconse-
quential. The vagueness of the standard is the first reason.
One illustration should suffice. Under Butler's proposal, it ap-
pears the government would be allowed to ban the sale of at
least hard-core obscenity.15 2 Perhaps, given the call for clear
judicial rules, there will be no rule-based limitation on gov-
ernmental regulation of the distribution of obscence mate-
rial, hard-core, soft-core, or otherwise.1 51 In either event, a
pornographer, put out of business by governmental conduct,
would have the right to sue for the interference with his lib-
erty. The jury decides whether to compensate him. If it finds
150. The effect of tapping into funds raised through general taxes in
circumstances that might seem less conducive to negative-sum results is ex-
plored in Browning, Collective Choice and General Fund Financing, 83 J. POL.
ECON. 377 (1975), and contrasted with alternatives in Buchanan, The Eco-
nomics of Earmarked Taxes, 71 J. POL. EcoN. 457 (1963); Goetz, Earmarked
Taxes and Majority Rule Budgetary Processes, 58 AMER. ECON. REV. 128
(1968); Goetz & McKnew, Paradoxical Results in a Public Choice Model of
Alternative Government Grant Forms, in THEORY OF PUBLIC CHOICE 224 (J.
Buchanan & R. Tollison, eds., 1972).
151. See Cass, Damage Suits Against Public Officers, 129 U. PA. L. REV.
1110, 1174-79 (1981). See also P. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT 102-09
(1983).
152. Cf., at 777.
153. The difficulty of articulating clear lines separating the obscene
from the non-obscene is the subject of much commentary. See, e.g., Kalven,
The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup. CT REV. 1, 41-45. The
most memorable expression of this thought is Justice Stewart's declaration
in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964): "It is possible to read the
Court's [definition of obscenity] . . . in a variety of ways . . . . [In this area
the Court is] faced with the task of trying to define what may be indefina-
ble. - I have reached the conclusion . . . that . . . criminal laws in this
area are constitutionally limited to hard core pornography. I shall not to-
day attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be em-
braced within that short hand description; and perhaps I could never suc-
ceed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it . (footnotes
omitted).
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the government acted properly, pursuing a legitimate public
interest, the jury still may decide that the pornographer bore
an unfair share of the social cost.'" Does he receive his lost
profits? The difference between that and the net income
from his next best job? For what period of time? And what of
those who never were but want to be pornographers? Or
those whose endowments, natural or otherwise, make them
especially suited to pornography? The questions that need to
be addressed to work out the operation of this right of action
are numerous; their difficulty is daunting; and the potential
cost of administering the judicial system that would have to
cope with these issues could be extraordinary.15
5
Any compensation system must face the difficult - read
also expensive - task of defining the contours of the right of
action. The reliance on juries, however, raises the cost in a
second and idiosyncratic way by reducing the degree to
which decisionmaking follows rules prescribed ex ante. Unlike
the ordinary choice between rule-bound and incremental
decisionmaking,5'5 Butler proposes to use decisionmakers
who are not likely to adhere to consistent goals much less to
have constant views on particular applications. 57
Ultimately, the critical question for each compensation
scheme may not be whether Samuelsonian criteria are suita-
ble metrics for judging social choice so much as whether the
suggested mechanism for effecting compensation moves us
toward or away from that ideal. Although there is no gen-
eral, formal right to veto social choices, or to insist on com-
pensation as quid pro quo for assent, social decisionmaking
rests on a bartering process that trades off assent to certain
acts for compensation in cash or, more often, in kind.15 1
There is no doubt that the political arena, in which these
trades now are made, does not replicate Samuelson's ideal.
154. See Butler's discussion of the jury's discretion to compensate in
cases related to "fungible liberties" at 773.
155. Cf Henderson, Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat from the
Rule of Law, 51 IND. L. J. 467 (1976) (making a similar point regarding
developments in tort law).
156. See, e.g., Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95
HARV. L. REV. 393 (1981).
157. See Simson, Jury Nullification in the American System: A Skeptical
View, 54 TEX. L. REV. 488 (1976). Even those who argue for the principle of
jury nullification do not defend the constancy of juries. See, e.g., Scheflin
and Van Dyke, supra note 129.
158. See, e.g., J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT
122-30 (1962); G. TULLOCK, TOWARD A MATHEMATICS OF POLITICS 57-61
(1967).
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But having these trade-offs made outside the political arena
may produce worse results. Indeed, it seems likely that a vari-
ety of serious problems of representative government -irra-
tional choice among competing preferences, lack of stable
choice solutions, difficulty of devising mechanisms to produce
"socially optimal" outcomes, risk of "dictatorial" determina-
tions15 9 - would be greatly exacerbated if a series of non-
representative juries took over the task of harmonizing diver-
gent individual values into determinate social choices.' 0
While some structural incentives to sub-optimal decisions are
eliminated, transferring decisional authority to juries also
removes some aspects of legislative decisionmaking that pro-
mote rational social choice."' But by committing so much
159. In his celebrated work, Professor Kenneth Arrow posited cer-
tain characteristics as incompatible with a desirable social choice mecha-
nism and then proved that any social choice process must have at least one
such attribute. See K. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d.
ed. 1963). Many of these "undesirable" attributes have indeed been found
in current decisional processes. See, e.g., R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMO-
CRATIC THEORY, (1956); A. DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY,
142-204 (1957); G. TULLOCK, supra note 167, at 100-55; McKelvey, lntran-
sitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda
Control, 12 J. ECON. THEORY 472 (1976); Plott, A Notion of Equilibrium and
its Possibility Under Majority Rule, 57 AMER. ECON. REV. 781 (1967).
160. Among other objections, there is no reason to believe that ju-
rors' preferences reflect the distribution of social preferences. The sample
size (including those called but rejected for jury duty) is incredibly small; a
draw of .001 per cent of the population would not be atypical in federal
judicial districts. Aside from the smallness of the sample, the selection-ex-
clusion process is not intended to insure representativeness. Moreover, ask-
ing jurors not simply to rank two preferences but to assign cardinal values
(introducing a far greater range of variables) increases the opportunity for
error (divergence from social preference distribution). Cf H. KALVEN & H.
ZEISEL, supra note 128 (noting greater variation between judges and juries
on amounts of compensation than on whether compensation should be
awarded).
161. Legislative decisionmaking tends to be a repeat play affair, en-
couraging the use of rules that promote stability and side payments that
permit different intensities of interest to be reflected. See, e.g., J. BUCHANAN
AND G. TULLOCK, supra note 158, at 122-98, 216-22; A. DOWNS, supra note
159, at 187-84. See also Coleman, The Possibility of a Social Welfare Function,
56 AMER. ECON. REV. 1105 (1966); Hoenack, On the Stability of Legislative
Outcomes, 41 PuB. CHOICE 251 (1983); McKelvey & Ordeshook, Vote Trad-
ing: An Experimental Study, 35 PUBLIC CHOICE 151 (1980); Niemi, Why So
Much Stability? - Another Opinion, 41 PUB. CHOICE 261 (1983); Shepsle, Insti-
tutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models, 23
AMER. J. POL. SCI. 27 (1979). These features, of course, do not guarantee
socially desirable decisions. See generally W. RIKER, THE THEORY OF POLITI-
CAL COALITIONS (1962); G. TULLOCK, supra note 158; Riker & Brains, The
Paradox of Vote-Trading, 67 AMER. POL Scl. REV. 1235 (1973).
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discretionary power to juries with so little guidance on its ex-
ercise, the proposed construction of the due process clauses
may marry the worst qualities of representative and non-rep-
resentative decisionmaking.
III. MAKING CHANGE: THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND
PROBLEMS OF LIBERTY
Resolution of the debate over operation of the due pro-
cess clauses necessarily involves the choice of a decisional pro-
cess. But it cannot rest on a process choice alone. The argu-
ment over what process is due, as indicated, requires
judgment respecting the substantive limits on legislative ac-
tion. This difficult decisional task in large part remains un-
changed under a variety of different approaches. Definition
of the scope of liberty that will be protected is problematic
whether one accepts or rejects calls for broadened power to
invalidate governmental incursions or to provide recompense
for them. The problem is especially acute if such interpretive
bonds as history may impose are cast off.
A critical element in the difficulty of precise definition,
one that is obscured to some extent by abstract discourse on
liberty, is the necessity for inter-personal comparison. Defin-
ing liberty seldom means protecting "individuals" against
"government." Discussions cast in these terms are mislead-
ing. Rather, the definitional task almost invariably means
trading reduced liberty for some individuals in exchange for
the increased liberty of others. No amount of mechanistic
tinkering can remove this individual conflict from the prob-
lem. John Stuart Mill's distinction between "self-regarding"
and "other-regarding" acts,"" the hoary sic utere tuo
maxim,"6 8 and Professor Terrell's "non-harm principle"'"
are three efforts to accomplish this operation by definition.
None works. Each simply raises the problem of inter-personal
comparison to the definitional level. 6
The objections to inter-personal utility comparisons are
162. J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 73-82, 93-97 (Hackett Pub. Co. ed. 1978)
(1st ed. London, 1859).
163. See W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 306.
164. Terrell at 560-567.
165. See, e.g., J. STEPHEN, LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY 27-30, 66-
67, 140-41 (Cambridge Univ. Press ed. 1967) (1st ed. London, 1873). A
defense of the use of such principles, combined with recognition of their
analytical weakness, is in H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION
266-67 (1968).
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well-known.' 66 These objections, however, do not prevent
clashes among individual preferences. Where market mecha-
nisms are not trusted (whether for technical or philosophical
reasons)1 7 to resolve these conflicts, the choice must be made
by the governmental decisionmaker. A thorough exploration
of this problem - indeed, even a quick romp through it -
would be well beyond the compass of this paper. This section
responds to a much less ambitious inclination: it serves only
to emphasize the necessity for moving from the high plane of
abstract definition of liberty and protection of it against gov-
ernmental invasion to the more mundane task of assessing
whose ox is getting gored, how badly, by whom, and with
what justification.
The First Amendment's protection for freedom of
speech illustrates both the necessity for inter-personal com-
parison and the resistance of large bodies of real problems to
global solutions. Freedom of speech is plainly within the lib-
erty now protected by the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment and would be included in some measure
under all definitions of liberty. Freedom of speech also impli-
cates the notion of progress. Despite occasional efforts to in-
ject historical data into decisions respecting this clause, free-
dom of speech in virtually all its details is a modern
invention. Our First Amendment jurisprudence dates from
World War 1.168 More to the point, it quickly moved from
concern over discovery of the Blackstonian notions that seem
to have informed the Amendment's framers' 9 to a fairly
noninterpretivist identification and implementation of speech
values. 170
The freedom of speech cases reveal the bankruptcy of a
simple bifurcation of interests between government and indi-
166. E.g., L. ROBBINS, ESSAY ON THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF Ec-
ONOMIC SCIENCE 138-41 (2d ed. 1948); Robbins, Interpersonal Comparisons of
Utility: A Comment, 48 ECON. J. 635 (1938). A critique more sympathetic to
such comparisons is Harsanyi, Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and
Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 63 J. POL. ECON. 309 (1955).
167. Compare Steiner, The Legislation of American Society: Economic Reg-
ulation, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1285 (1983), with Sen, Personal Utilities and Public
Judgments: Or What's Wrong with Welfare Economics, 89 ECON. J. 537 (1979).
168. See, e.g., Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doc-
trine, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1205 (1983).
169. See generally L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF
SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY (1960).
170. See, e.g., Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The First
Amendment's Freedom of Speech and Freedom of Press Clauses, 29 DRAKE L.
REV. 1 (1979-1980).
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vidual. Large stretches of this landscape are understood as
ground on which adverse individual interests contest. Defa-
mation cases obviously implicate competing individual liberty
interests. 1 7 So, too, do cases involving invasion of privacy by
publication. 172 Conflicts between a "captive" audience7 3 and
speakers are other obvious examples. Objections to speakers'
loudness,1 7 4 offensiveness, 175 or simple intrusion on individual
desires to be left alone7M have provided one set of liberty in-
terests in these cases. The cases involving picketing177 and so-
licitation17 8 likewise present adverse liberty claims. And even
cases that seem less amenable to such a construction present
similar conflicts. Regulation of non-public obscenity, for in-
stance, poses a contest between the liberties to enjoy two dif-
ferent sorts of society.1
79
The difficulty of devising general resolutions for these
conflicts should be evident to anyone who spends much time
with free speech issues. The First Amendment literature is
replete with argument over balancing versus categoriza-
tion, 80 and of absolute versus variable protection. 81 Careful
171. E.g., Ingber, Defamation: A Conflict Between Reason and Decency,
65 VA. L. REV. 785 (1979); Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on the
"Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191, 215.
172. See Nimmer, The Right to Speak From Times to Time: First Amend-
ment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 935,
956-967 (1968).
173. See Black, He Cannot Choose But Hear: The Plight of the Captive
Auditor, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 960 (1953). The degree of captivity, it should be
noted, seldom is free from dispute. In at least some jurists' opinion, while
iron bars do not a prison make, one can be captured by such ephemera as
radio waves. See Federal Communications Comm'n v. Pacifica Found'n, 438
U.S. 726 (1978).
174. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); Saia v. New York,
334 U.S. 558 (1948).
175. See Federal Communications Comm'n v. Pacifica Found'n, 438
U.S. 726 (1978); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
176. E.g., Public Utilities Comm'n. v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
177. See, e.g., NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760, 377
U.S. 58 (1964); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
178. See, e.g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Conscious-
ness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981); Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Environ-
ment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
179. See generally H. CLOR, OBSCENITY AND PUBLIC MORALITY: CENSOR-
SHIP IN LIBERAL SOCIETY (1969); Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin
of Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 391 (1963).
180. See, e.g. Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categori-
zation and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARv. L. REV 1481
(1974); Scanlon, Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, 40 U.
PITT. L. REV. 519 (1979); Lupu, Book Review, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 394
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First Amendment scholars recognize the limited significance
of these debates.8 2 To a large degree, they obscure the com-
plexity of "the" free speech problem. 8 The competing indi-
vidual interests take many different forms and are arrayed
one against another in countless combinations. No single ap-
proach can resolve all these conflicts satisfactorily. Solutions
that seem to work in one area manifestly do not work in
others.
Thus, for example, the incitement-advocacy line, a rela-
tively comfortable standard in criminal conspiracy cases, is of
no relevance to defamation and even may not work in all
crime-speech cases.'" Knowledge of falsity, or recklessness as
to it, may seem a proper standard in some defamation
cases.'" But it seems ill-advised to require regulation of com-
mercial advertising' s6 or promotion of corporate securities 87
(1983).
181. See, e.g., Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance 71 YALE L.J.
1424 (1962); Meikeljohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT.
REV. 245; Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in the
Balance, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 821 (1962).
182. See Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three
Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 245 (1981); Shiffrin, Defamatory Non-Media Speech
and First Amendment Methodology, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 915 (1978).
183. See Cass, supra note 122 at 1313-37; Schauer, supra note 182;
Shiffrin, supra note 182. Freedom of speech cannot be defined in the ab-
stract. Some attempts to construct abstract, general theories have resulted
in retreat, as the proponent works through the applications of his theory.
Compare, e.g., A. MEIKELJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-Gov-
ERNMENT (1948), with Meikeljohn, supra note 181; compare Scanlon, A The-
ory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFFAIRS 204 (1972), with
Scanlon, supra note 180. Other such theories, not reexamined, have been
left as intellectual derelicts, relegated to ritual citation by academics cata-
loguing the various improbable suggestions that indeed have been offered.
184. See Schauer, supra note 182, at 297-98; Shiffrin, supra note 182,
at 946-51. See generally Greenawalt, Speech and Crime, 1980 AMER. B.
FOUND'N RES. J. 645.
185. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80
(1964).
186. Cf Charles of the Ritz Distrib. Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm'n,
143 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1944) (tendency to mislead sufficient basis to pro-
scribe "deceptive" advertising); Millstein, The Federal Trade Commission and
False Advertising, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 439 (1964) (discussing scope of FTC
authority and suggesting limitations, well short of New York Times-type stan-
dards, on future regulation of advertising).
187. See Securities Act of 1933, c. 38, Title I, § 8, codified at 15
U.S.C. § 77h (1976) (proscribing securities registration statements that are
incomplete, inaccurate, untrue, or misleading without respect to the regis-
trant's state of mind); id., § 11, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976) (provid-
ing civil liability for such statements); id., § 12, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 771
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or of corporate officials 88 to rest on so speech-protective a
standard. At the same time, it would be an intolerably under-
protective standard if applied to claims of candidates for po-
litical office.'8 9
Arguments over the form for balancing one liberty inter-
est against another in this area and over their presumptive
weights are not irrelevant. 190 Discussion of when balancing or
categorization should take place and how it should proceed
does have utility. The hard decisions, however, are not made
at this level.
The same point can be made for most basic discussion of
constitutional interpretation. Greater scope may be desired
for legislative or judicial will. More or less attention to histor-
ical evidence as a guide to constitutional adjudication may be
deemed advisable. Generalities such as these, along with ab-
stract descriptions of liberty and broad schemes for its pro-
tection, influence constitutional decisionmaking. Their im-
portance should not be minimized. At the same time, these
judgments do not dispense with the need for careful consid-
eration of how competing claims to liberty should be harmo-
nized in particular circumstances. Progress in constitutional
adjudication is a matter of perspective. But we should not
stand too far back.
(1976) (civil liability for untrue or misleading statements in securities pro-
spectus absent proof by defendant that he did not know and could not rea-
sonably be expected to have known of falsity or misleading nature of state-
ment); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983) (prohibiting, without regard to the
maker's state of mind untrue or misleading statements in connection with
the purchase or sale of securities); Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. Lowe,
725 F.2d 892, (2d Cir. 1984) (upholding, contra First Amendment claim,
SEC ban on investment advisory newsletter), rev'd, 105 S.Ct. 2557 (1985).
See also T. FRANKEL, 3 REGULATION OF MONEY MANAGERS 582 n. 304 (1980).
188. See 17 C.F.R., 240.14a-9 (1983) (prohibiting the use of false or
misleading statements or omissions in proxy solicitations, including solicita-
tions for election of corporate directors and officers).
189. There is a substantial controversy respecting the bona fides of
candidates' promises. Those who believe that candidates are intelligent but
dishonest assert that office-seekers cannot believe the bulk of their public
statements, for example, claims that one simultaneously will balance the
federal budget, reduce taxes, and increase defense spending. Those who
believe candidates are honest but slow-witted hold a contrary view. Neither
group, however, advocates legal sanctions for knowing falsehood in politi-
cal campaigns. Most thoughtful commentary endorses Adlai Stevenson's
epigram: "Your public servants serve you right."
190. Schauer, supra note 182.
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